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Ethnicity, Strategic Mobilization and Voting in the Romanian 
Parliamentary Elections of 2008 
 
Marius I. TĂTAR  
 
 
 
Abstract. Social scientists have made contradictory claims about the impact of ethnicity on 
social cohesion, the levels of social trust, civic and political engagement. This paper 
conceptualizes ethnic diversity as a contextual variable and evaluates its effect on the 
electoral participation of the Hungarian minority from Romania, using a case study of the 
Romanian Parliamentary Elections of 2008. The article examines the differences in turnout 
between Hungarian electors living in different counties of Romania, and how this varies by 
the ethnic composition of the counties. We discern two patterns of electoral participation 
of the Hungarian minority: lower turnout in ethnically non-competitive counties (i.e. low 
ethnical diversity, with the size of Hungarian minority below 8% or above 50% of the 
county’s total population); higher turnout in ethnically competitive counties (i.e. higher 
ethnical diversity, with the size of the Hungarian minority between 8% and 50% of the 
county’s population). The findings support the “strategic mobilization hypothesis” 
according to which electoral mobilization was unevenly distributed due to various stakes 
attributed to voting in different electoral districts, followed by a pragmatic cost/benefit 
logic adopted by the leaders and partisans of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania (DAHR).              
 
Keywords: ethnic voting, electoral mobilization, Hungarian minority, Romania                      
 
 
Introduction 
 
Ethnic voting is one of the persistent features of electoral behavior in post-
communist Romania, especially in the areas inhabited by the Hungarian minority. 
Since 1990, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania’s (DAHR from now 
on) electoral performance always reliably reflected the ethnic share of the 
Hungarian minority and assured it political representation in the Romanian 
Parliament. Both the Romanian public opinion and academia attributed DAHR’s 
electoral success to the high solidarity and unity of a much disciplined Hungarian 
electorate. On the other hand, the leaders and partisans of the Romanian political 
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parties perceived that the above average electoral turnout of Hungarians was not 
only a consequence of a higher sense of voting as a civic duty among Hungarians, 
but also a result of the enviable electoral mobilization capacity of DAHR and its 
local branches.  
However, the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections seem to misfit 
Hungarian minority’s behavioral pattern outlined above. The counties where the 
Hungarians represent the majority of the population (namely Harghita and 
Covasna) had among the lowest electoral turnouts. Overall, Hungarians had a lower 
propensity to vote in these elections, compared to the rest of the population of 
Romania. What is even more puzzling is that DAHR’s partisans had a lower 
probability to vote than their counterparts from the main Romanian political 
parties. This paper explores the reasons behind the electoral patterns’ dynamics of 
the Hungarian minority from Romania. More specifically, the paper aims to answer 
the following research question: Why did Hungarians have a lower propensity to 
vote in the Romanian parliamentary elections of 2008, compared to non-
Hungarians?  
I will assess two alternative hypothetical answers to this question, using 
both county aggregated data and individual-level survey data:  
H1:  Non-vote as political disaffection: Hungarians had a lower propensity 
to vote because they were less satisfied with government performance and 
political leaders, than non-Hungarians;  
H2: Non-vote as strategic de(mobilization): Hungarians’ probability to vote 
is contingent upon a contextual variable, namely the ethnic diversity of the county 
of residence. Therefore, Hungarians had a higher propensity to vote in ethnically 
competitive counties (i.e. with high ethnic diversity) and a lower propensity to vote 
in ethnically non-competitive counties (i.e. with low ethnic diversity).  
   The paper is structured in 6 parts. In the first section of the article, I 
review two strands of academic literature in which this research is theoretically 
embedded, namely ethno-politics and mobilization theory. Then, I outline the 
ethnic dimension of electoral behavior in post-communist Romania with a special 
emphasis on the electoral turnout of the Hungarian minority. In section three, I 
focus on the electoral participation of the Hungarian voters and as well as DAHR’s 
partisans, in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Section four presents the 
institutional context, namely the electoral reform of 2008, which changed the 
party-list proportional-representation system with a new electoral design, based on 
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single-member electoral districts. In section 5, I assess the impact of the 
institutional and ethnic contexts on the patterns of electoral behavior of the 
Hungarian minority’s members, in different counties of Romania. In section 6, I 
draw the conclusions of the paper.  
 
Ethno-politics and Electoral Mobilization: An Outline of the Theoretical Framework 
 
The first strand of academic literature which theoretically frames this 
research examines the relationship between ethnicity and politics. Ethno-politics 
derived its popularity in many parts of the world form the enduring character of 
ethnicity as a political resource. Ethnicity is one of the factors though to influence 
the likelihood a person will be politically engaged. The impact of ethnicity on 
political engagement is very complex, however, and can only be suggested here. 
More specifically, as Woshinsky (2008) has pointed out, the influence of ethnicity 
on political behavior can be mediated or even obscured by other factors among 
which the most prominent is social status. In many cases, individuals belonging to 
ethnic minority groups, especially those despised by the majority, will be less 
politically active than average because usually minority groups are poorer and 
lower on social status than average, and groups toward the lower end of the 
socioeconomic spectrum are usually less politically active (Woshinsky, 2008, p. 
90). 
 However, if such socioeconomic differences between minority groups 
and the majority are insignificant, or if in our analyses we control for the effect of 
social status variables, it might turn out that in fact ethnic minority groups are 
more active than majority ones. The question then is why, ceteris paribus, the 
political involvement is usually higher in ethnic minority groups than average? 
According to Woshinsky (2008) the main reason has to do with social 
identification. Minority groups’ members in all cultures tend to be more 
conscious of their group identity. In turn this group identification makes them 
more attuned on how society, through its political mechanisms, can affect their 
daily life (Woshinsky, 2008). Social consciousness derived from strong social 
identity is producing political participation of ethnic minority members especially 
when it is backed by an organization that can provide the mobilization framework 
necessary for political activism. 
Ethnic parties represent the most evident organizational aspect of ethno-
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politics (Salat, 2009). They have been successful in fostering ethnic identities, 
mobilizing voters and voter loyalty in elections in many democracies. Some 
authors even claim that in terms of electoral performance, ethno-nationalist 
parties have done better than class-based parties, especially in the Western 
democracies were class-based cleavages seem to fade away (Alonso, 2008). 
Despite a widespread decline of political parties’ membership accompanied by a 
decline of turnout in elections, ethnic parties seem to have better preserved their 
electoral constituencies and most of the time display a remarkable stability in 
terms of electoral performance.  
What are the potential explanations for the relative electoral advantage 
of ethno-nationalist parties compared to class-based parties? The answer to this 
question can be framed by the  academic debate on the meanings of ethnicity 
underpinned from two different perspectives supported by primordialists, on the 
one hand, and constructivists, on the other hand (Hasmath, 2011). According to 
Alonso (2008, p. 82) primordialists (see Geertz, 1973; Gellner, 1983; Horowitz, 
1985) would say that people think of ethnicity in primordial terms and therefore 
once created ethnic identities tend to be stable, and ethnic voters tend to be 
more rigid in their loyalties. Ethnic parties transform this rigidity in to and 
electoral advantage. When voting is mainly based on ethnic membership 
electoral performance is expected to be stable as a straightforward reflection of 
ethnic demography (Horowitz, 1985, apud. Alonso, 2008, pp. 82-83).  
In contrast, constructivists (Brubaker, 2004; Chandra, 2004, apud. Alonso, 
2008, p. 83) would say that individual ethnic identities are easily changeable and 
highly malleable. Therefore one should not expect a priori more stable support 
for ethno-nationalist parties than for any other type of party. Ethnic parties are 
not mere reflections of ethnic demography, constructionist would say (Alonso, 
2008, p. 83). Yet, why then ethno-nationalist parties seem to be more stable in 
terms of electoral performance than class-based parties? Alonso (2008) believes 
that one possible answer could be that they are judged by voters using different 
criteria. Class-based parties are judged sensitively by voters on economic matters 
and they are highly vulnerable of electoral punishment on these grounds. On the 
contrary, ethnic parties are judged not so much on government performance but 
mainly in terms of the government’s success “to represent the group that 
considers itself to have a national identity different form the rest of the 
population” (Aguilar & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2008, p. 127). For these reasons, Sonia 
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Alonso argues that the main political consequences of ethnic allegiances can be 
summarized as follows: 
“… if it is true that ethnic allegiances provide nationalist parties with a 
competitive electoral advantage over class-based parties, ceteris paribus (i.e. 
under similar institutional settings), ethnic parties should show lower fluctuation 
of votes, less electoral punishment, lengthier durations in office, and less 
political erosion with the passage of time than class-based parties” (Alonso, 
2008, p. 89). 
The second strand of literature outlined here is mobilization theory, 
which emphasizes the role of mobilizing agents as a source of political 
participation of the citizens. The main argument of the mobilization theory is that 
people need a catalyst in order to participate.  This could be a candidate, political 
party or other type of organizations or social networks that could drive people to 
politics. Even among individuals with similar socio-economic and attitudinal 
characteristics, there may be varying degrees of political participation due to the 
influences exerted by different mobilizing agents (Norris, 2002). These actors are 
well informed, know what are the ways and means of action which can bring 
benefits and therefore have every incentive to mobilize citizens to achieve certain 
political goals (Comşa, 2006). 
Thus, the theories of mobilization highlight the importance of agents 
either taken individually (as the political leaders) or collectively as social 
organizations and networks generated by parties, unions, voluntary organizations 
and community associations which act as mobilizers of participation (Rosenstone 
& Hansen, 1993). According to Rosenstone and Hansen’s comprehensive study of 
political mobilization, this concept is defined as “the process by which candidates, 
parties, activists, and groups induce other people to participate” (1993, p. 25). 
Moreover, mobilization theorists highlight the link between the patterns of 
participation and the choices and incentives for participation structured by 
politically mobilizing agents. Furthermore, people will be mobilized through 
affiliation to political organizations, where they might be asked by others to take 
part and there is an increasing number of evidence that shows that links to 
parties and different social groups are important predictors of turnout 
(Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Tătar, 2011). In brief, according to mobilization 
theory, people do participate primarily not because they can and want to 
participate, but because they were asked for by mobilizing agents. 
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The electoral relevance of ethnicity in post-communist Romania 
 
Electoral behavior in Romania has a significant, and historically and 
geographically well documented, ethnic dimension1, especially in Transylvania, including 
also the North-Western parts of the country (Bodocan, 2001; Ilieș, 1998; Șișeștean, 2002). 
But even within these regions, ethnic voting has an important territorial distribution, 
being more salient in some electoral districts then in others. After 1989, most of the 
ethnic minority groups from Romania have organized themselves in cultural associations 
aiming to preserve their identity and to represent them politically. Consequently, there is 
a plethora of organizations which participate in the Romanian parliamentary elections in 
different electoral districts that correspond more or less with the territorial distribution of 
specific ethnic minority groups (Bodocan, 2001).  
However, in this paper I will focus on the political representation of the 
Hungarian minority form Romania and more specifically on the electoral performance of 
the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). DAHR has certain peculiarities 
when compared with other ethnic minority organizations from Romania. For instance, it 
is the only ethnic-based organization that has always passed the electoral threshold2 in 
the Romanian parliamentary elections after 1989, and obtained proportional political 
representation for the Hungarian minority more or less in accordance with its share in 
the total population of Romania (Bodocan, 2001). DAHR is also different from the 
Romanian majority’s political parties, being the political organization with the most stable 
electoral performance in the volatile post-communist political landscape of Romania: it 
has constantly gained seats in the Romanian Parliament under the same label and the 
same organizational structure (Salat, 2009).  
                                                          
1
 Ethnic voting is also relatively frequent in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Some authors argue that the map of ethnic voting in this region is simply mirroring the 
legacies of ethnic minority issues which appeared with the late formation of national states in 
this part of Europe (Vandermotten, Lockhart, & Freyer-Macola, 2003). 
2
 The actual electoral threshold is of 5% of the total votes, or alternatively, a party would 
need to win the elections in 6 deputy districts and 3 senatorial districts. Some authors call 
this alternative threshold “lex DAHR” as they argue it was mainly conceived “as a safety 
belt” in case the DAHR would not pass the 5% threshold (Székely, 2009). Except the 
DAHR, none of the ethnic minorities’ organizations has passed the 5% threshold in the last 
parliamentary elections. However, even if their representative organizations do not pass the 
electoral, each officially recognized national minority is granted a seat in the lower chamber 
of the Romanian Parliament (Chamber of Deputies). The representatives of national 
minorities in the Romanian Parliament constitute a distinct parliamentary group which 
regularly consists of 18 deputies. DAHR has its own, separate parliamentary groups, both in 
the Romanian Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.    
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Table 1: The electoral performance of DAHR in parliamentary elections, 1990-2008 
Year General 
Turnout 
Romania 
(%) 
DAHR’s electoral performance 
Chamber of Deputies Senate 
Votes % Seats Votes % Seats 
1990 86.19 991601 7.23 29 1004353 7.20 12 
1992 76.29 822290 7.46 27 831469 7.58 12 
1996 76.01 812628 6.64 25 837760 6.82 11 
2000 65.31 736863 6.80 27 751310 6.90 12 
2004 58.51 628125 6.17 22 637109 6.23 10 
2008 39.20 425008 6.17 22 440449 6.39 9 
Data source: Salat (2009, p. 121) 
 
In spite of its enduring electoral performance (see Table 1), DAHR is legally and 
formally not a political party (with a certain political ideology), but an umbrella 
organization which aims to promote and represent the interests of the Hungarian 
minority from Romania. However the political recast of the DAHR in the last 20 years is 
similar to the one of an ethnic party: “from an organization primarily concerned with the 
identity problems of the Hungarian minority in Romania to an organization interested 
mainly in increasing its electoral/political performance and coalition building potential” 
(Salat, 2009, p. 115). The lack of a strong and clear ideological position and its relative size 
(about 6-9 % of the seats in Parliament) are two important factors that make DAHR the 
ideal partner in coalition governments3 led by Romanian political parties that 
ideologically place themselves either at the left or right wings of the political spectrum. As 
Salat (2009, p. 118) points out, after 1996 the behavior of DAHR’s leaders has been 
increasingly dominated by what can be labeled as “political rationality” accomplished by 
a pragmatic shift from a politics centered on the identity issues to a politics focusing 
mainly on granting access to resources through electoral success and the subsequent 
conversion of this success into political influence and governmental positions. The access 
to resources was then used as a mechanism to marginalize more radical leaders4, and the 
                                                          
3
 From 1996, DAHR has almost continuously participated in government coalitions in a form 
or another: from 1996 until 2000 it was a member of the governing coalition led by the 
Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR); from 2000 to 2004 it had a cooperation 
agreement with the governing Social Democratic Party (PSD); from 2004 until the end of 
2008 it was again part of the governing coalition; since 2010 is participating in the governing 
coalition led by the Democrat Liberal Party (PDL).  
4
 In 2002, Gheorghe Şişeştean assessed the role of the DAHR’s participation in coalition 
governments in Romania as having ambivalent consequences: on the one hand, is a test of 
the Hungarian political elite’s willingness to participate in the decision making process in the 
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development of strong local clientele and a well organized network of political caucuses 
able to electorally mobilize the constituencies (Salat, 2009).    
However, we cannot fully assess the electoral performance of the DAHR if we do 
not take into consideration the general patterns of electoral participation in Romania, 
after 1990. Data in table 1 point out that turnout in the Romanian parliamentary 
elections has dramatically declined in the last 20 years (Alexandru, Moraru, & Ercuş, 
2009) by over 50%: from 86.19 % in 1990 to only 39.20 % in 2008. In a similar vein, DAHR 
lost more than half of the votes (numbers in absolute terms) in the last 20 years: from 
991601 votes for the DAHR’s candidates for the Chamber of Deputies in 1990 to 425008 
votes in 2008. On the other hand, this dramatic decline is obscured if we only look at the 
DAHR’s share of total votes casted in each election which seems remarkably stable 
(around 6-7%) both for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. But this stability might 
prove to be only illusory if we take into account the general decline of electoral 
participation in Romanian parliamentary elections, regardless of ethnicity (Hungarians 
and non-Hungarians) or political and ideological affiliation. 
 
Figure 1: DAHR’s lost votes vs. lost seats in subsequent parliamentary elections 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on data presented in Table 1. 
Note: data represent % of DAHR’s lost votes/seats compared to previous election for the lower 
chamber of the Romanian Parliament (i.e. Chamber of Deputies). 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
Romanian state, and at the same time, it helped to mitigate the segregationist fears existing in 
some segments of the Romanian population (Şişeştean, 2002, p. 152). 
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Figure 1 further explores the patterns of DAHR’s electoral performance by 
comparing the percentage of lost votes with that of lost seats in two subsequent 
elections. In general, as one should expect there is a correlation between the 
shares of lost votes with the share of lost seats. However there are two notable 
exceptions from this rule. The first one, in 2000, when although DAHR lost more 
than 9% of votes compared with 1996, it gained around 8% more seats than in 
1996. The second exception, and the one more relevant for the scope of this paper, 
is revealed by the parliamentary elections of 2008. Compared with 2004, although 
DAHR lost almost one third of the votes it did not lose any seat in the Chamber of 
Deputies. This is again in line with the fact there has been a general decline of 
turnout (both of Hungarians and Romanians) in the Romanian parliamentary 
elections of 2008 compared with previous elections: turnout has dropped from 
58.51% in 2004 to only 39.20% in 2008. Consequently, in 2008 DAHR preserved its 
relative share of seats in the lower chamber of the Parliament mainly because the 
Romanian political parties have also lost significant amounts of votes, compared 
with the previous election of 2004. 
 
Hungarian voters and partisans in the 2008 parliamentary elections in Romania  
 
Despite declining turnout, Hungarians from Romania remain largely DAHR’s 
"captive" electorate. All the data we have point out the electoral prevalence of the 
ethnic cleavage for the Hungarian minority’s voters and DAHR partisans. For 
instance, over 70% of the Hungarian voters in the 2008 parliamentary elections in 
Romania actually voted for DAHR. On the other hand, over 90% of the DAHR’s 
voters and over 92% of the DAHR’s partisans (those who feel closer to DAHR than 
to any other political party) declared themselves as Hungarians5. They also have a 
generally low electoral fluctuation, that is Hungarian voters generally do not 
migrate from one party to another. Although some dissatisfied parts of the 
Hungarian minority also voted in the local elections of 2008 for another Hungarian 
party from Romania, namely the Hungarian Civic Party (HCP), the electoral 
performance of this party was rather modest6 (Salat, 2009; Székely, 2009). 
However, the relative immobility of Hungarian voters does not necessarily translate 
                                                          
5
 Estimations based on the European Social Survey 4 applied in Romania in December 2008-
January 2009, right after the parliamentary elections held on 30 November 2008) 
6
 The Hungarian Civic party did not participate in the electoral contest of 2008 as a party, but 
supported several independent candidates competing against the candidates of DAHR. 
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into a steady adherence of Hungarians to DAHR. Some authors even believe that 
while in opposition (during 2009), DAHR could try to reinforce the weakened ties 
with its electorate (Salat, 2009, p. 127). Moreover, Vladimir Pasti argues that the 
dynamics of the electoral behavior of the Hungarians from Romania is illustrating, 
in quasi-experimental conditions, the loss of trust of previously loyal voters in the 
political elites that represent them (Pasti, 2009, pp. 341-342). 
 
Table 2: The propensity of the Hungarian minority’s members to vote in the 
parliamentary elections of 2008 (Logistic regression analysis) 
Dependent variable:  
1=voter, 0=non-voter 
 
Predictors B SE Wald df P 
Exp 
(B) 
95% CI for  
Exp. (B) 
Inf. Sup. 
Constant -
3.945 
.372 112.57 1 .000 .019 
  
Age (years) .020 .004 32.321 1 .000 1.020 1.013 1.027 
Male(1) .282 .101 7.773 1 .005 1.326 1.087 1.617 
Hungarian(1) -.455 .197 5.368 1 .021 .634 .431 .932 
Residence in rural area (1) .718 .107 44.702 1 .000 2.050 1.661 2.531 
Married (1) .353 .109 10.438 1 .001 1.423 1.149 1.763 
Children in household (1) .269 .116 5.408 1 .020 1.309 1.043 1.643 
Education (years of schooling) .024 .016 2.306 1 .129 1.025 .993 1.058 
Happiness scale (0-10) .013 .025 .257 1 .612 1.013 .964 1.064 
Media consumption index .025 .011 5.283 1 .022 1.026 1.004 1.048 
Subjective general health (1) .272 .110 6.064 1 .014 1.312 1.057 1.629 
Working abroad experience (1) -.963 .269 12.775 1 .000 .382 .225 .647 
Income .064 .036 3.176 1 .075 1.066 .994 1.143 
State owned company employee (1) .298 .129 5.291 1 .021 1.347 1.045 1.736 
Active in NGO (1) .542 .327 2.759 1 .097 1.720 .907 3.263 
Voluntary work (1) .512 .205 6.271 1 .012 1.669 1.118 2.492 
Trade unionist (1) .075 .121 .387 1 .534 1.078 .851 1.366 
Generalized trust scale (0-10) .060 .019 10.096 1 .001 1.062 1.023 1.102 
Church attendance frequency .193 .036 28.154 1 .000 1.212 1.129 1.302 
 Model Omnibus Test χ
2
(18) = 243.30, p < 0.001, N = 2053 
R
2 
(Cox & Snell) = 0.112, R
2 
(Nagelkerke) = 0.151 
Hosmer & Lemeshow Test χ
2
(8) = 4.784, p =0.780 
Overall  correct classification rate = 66.7% 
Source: own elaboration based on ESS4 post-electoral survey. 
 
For the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections, Hungarians not only voted 
in lower proportions compared with 2004, but also they had a lower propensity to 
vote then non-Hungarians from Romania (i.e. Romanians and also the other ethnic 
minority groups). Table 2 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis of the 
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predictors of voting in the 2008 parliamentary elections using post-electoral survey 
data. As highlighted in Table 2, Hungarians had a significantly lower propensity to 
vote (over 1.5 times lower probability) than non-Hungarians, even when we control 
for the effect of some basic socio-demographic variables as well as for the 
influence of different social capital indicators. Estimations from ESS 4 (2008) data, 
point out that around 34% of the Hungarians and 40% of the non-Hungarians voted 
in the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections. 
 
Table 3: Partisans’ mobilization to vote in the 2008 parliamentary elections7 
 
Non-
voters 
Voters Total 
Partisans of… 
National Liberal party (PNL) 37% 63% 100% 
Democrat-Liberal Party (PD-L) 35% 65% 100% 
Social Democrat Party (PSD) 25% 75% 100% 
Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians from Romania 
(DAHR) 
39% 61% 100% 
Total (Partisans in Romania) 34% 66% 100% 
Source: own elaboration based on ESS4 post-electoral survey. 
Note: data represent the % of voters and non-voters among the respondents who fell closer to a 
specific party than to other parties (i.e. are the partisans of a specific party). 
 
What is even more puzzling is that not only Hungarian electors had a lower 
probability to vote, but also DAHR’s partisans8 (which represent around 35% of the 
voting age Hungarians from Romania) had a lower propensity to vote than their 
counterparts from other Romanian political parties9 (see Table 3). For instance, 
around 39% of DAHR’s partisans did not vote compared to an average of 34% of 
the total number of partisans in Romania which did not cast a ballot in the 2008 
elections. How can one explain that although some people feel close to a specific 
party, a significant part of them tend not to vote (they are "partisan non-voters")? 
                                                          
7
 For the sake of simplicity and clarity I present here only the results for the partisans of main 
political parties from Romania, although in some of the statistical analysis carried out for this 
research I included all the parties which were present in the ESS4 survey dataset. 
8
 Here, I use the term partisan to mean a person who declares that s/he feels closer to a 
specific political party then to all the other political parties. 
9
 Comparing the rates of absenteeism among partisans, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
seems to have mobilized the best its supporters in the parliamentary elections of 2008, only 
about 25% of those who declared themselves closer to this political party did not cast a 
ballot. 
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We believe that “partisan non-vote” can be interpreted both as a way to express 
political discontent and as a non-voting strategy based on rational calculation. 
Thus, on the one hand, partisan non-voters could be included in the category of 
those who were somewhat disappointed with the performance or decisions taken 
by certain politicians of the party they feel closer. On the other hand, partisan non-
voters could also fall in the category of those who believe that the electoral stake is 
very low and therefore it does not deserve to take the effort to go voting, or 
alternatively, the elections are not competitive enough and their party will win or 
lose the election anyway, with or without their vote (i.e. their vote will not bring an 
additional number of parliamentary seats to the party or conversely will not reduce 
the number of seats won anyhow). 
In the case of the political parties that have obtained parliamentary seats in 
the 2008 elections, the two situations (non-voting as dissatisfaction and strategic 
non-voting as a rational calculus) are best illustrated, on the one hand, by the 
National Liberal Party (PNL), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians from 
Romania (DAHR), on the other. The two political parties are best suited for a 
comparison in this respect due to several reasons. First, PNL fits to a certain degree 
the pattern of what has been labeled in the theoretical framework of this paper as 
a class-based party with a strong commitment to the liberal ideology. On the other 
hand, as showed above, the DAHR politically behaves as an ethnic party. Second, in 
late 2008, PNL together with DAHR were both in power, forming the governing 
coalition10, so that they were both in an incumbent position in the 2008 
parliamentary election. Third, the ESS4 post-electoral survey showed that in the 
winter of 2008/2009 both political parties had the highest shares of partisans 
(people close to the party) which did not vote in the parliamentary elections of 
2008 (see Table 3: 39% of those close to DAHR and 37% of those close to PNL 
approach did not vote).  
The reasons for which the supporters of the two parties did not vote seem 
to be different, however. If among PNL partisans occurs the lowest degree of trust 
in politicians (an average of 3.53 on a scale from 0="no trust at all" to 10="total 
confidence") of all parliamentary parties’ supporters, sympathizers of UDMR show 
the highest degree of confidence (an average of 3.72 on the same scale from 0 to 
10). However, Liberal supporters were most disgruntled with the government (an 
                                                          
10
 Although in parliament the two parties did not have a majority, they have negotiated the 
support of PSD for certain legislative projects and initiatives. 
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average of 3.86 on a scale of 0 - "completely dissatisfied" to 10 - "completely 
satisfied") compared with the supporters of PD-L (average 3.99) and especially 
those of DAHR, which were the most satisfied with the work of the Executive11 (an 
average of 4.56).  
The comparative data presented above (PNL-DAHR) seem to support the 
hypothesis that ethnic allegiances provide ethnic-parties with and competitive 
electoral advantage over class-based parties, all other things being equal, ethnic 
parties suffered less electoral punishment and less electoral erosion than class 
based parties. In the case of PNL the high rate of absenteeism from voting of those 
who feel closer to this party could be explained, among other factors, by the low 
level of trust in politicians and the relatively high rate of dissatisfaction with the 
liberal governance. However, in the case of DAHR’s supporters non-voting as an 
“electoral punishment” is a less plausible hypothesis for at least two reasons: a. 
Hungarians were relatively more satisfied with government performance than non-
Hungarians in 2008 (although DAHR was part of the governmental coalition in 2008 
as mentioned above); b. In 2008, Hungarians tended to be more trustful in political 
leaders and in political institutions than non-Hungarians. Yet why, then, Hungarians 
had a lower propensity to vote than non-Hungarians and, moreover, why DAHR’s 
supporters tended to vote less in the 2008 elections than supporters of other 
political parties? The explanation of the increased absenteeism of DAHR’s 
supporters seems to be connected with to the mobilization (or rather 
demobilization) strategies as a rational decision of both DAHR’s leaders and the 
Hungarian electorate. 
 
Institutional context: The Electoral Reform of 2008 
 
To provide a potential explanation for this strategic mobilization (which 
actually meant in some areas lack of mobilization) of DAHR’s voters, we need to 
make some clarifications about the institutional context in which parliamentary 
elections were held in 2008. For the first time since 1989, MPs were elected in 
single-member districts. In 2008, in each county were drawn a specific number of 
                                                          
11
 To test whether the differences between party supporters in terms of satisfaction with the 
work of the Government are statistically significant I used the analysis of variance (one way 
ANOVA). Satisfaction with Government’s activity differ significantly between supporters of 
the 9 political parties (8 nominally mentioned political parties plus an "other party" choice) 
included in the questionnaire of ESS4 in 2008/2009: F (8, 608) = 3.452 p = 0.001. 
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electoral districts depending on the size of the population of that county. The 
drawing of these districts was done in an Electoral Code Commission based on 
proposals from political parties and negotiations between them. In each district 
was disputed only one parliamentary seat and each party could propose a single 
candidate. Each elector could vote for only one candidate in the electoral district 
of residence. How could a candidate win a parliamentary seat? In the first stage, 
a candidate would need to win the majority of the votes in the single-member 
electoral districts (i.e. 50% of votes + 1). In the second stage, if none of the 
candidates won a majority of votes in the single-member electoral district, there 
was a proportional redistribution of seats, at county level, among the parties 
which passed the electoral threshold.  
I believe that, in terms of the competitiveness of the 2008 elections, 
there were two types of single-member electoral districts. Non-competitive 
electoral districts are overlapping more or less faithfully the electoral fief12 of a 
political party and the winning of the parliamentary seat by the dominant 
political party’s candidate in that college is almost certain. Competitive electoral 
districts are those that do not overlap any electoral fief and in which 
parliamentary seats are really disputed, none of the parties is dominant and 
therefore none of the candidates has the certainty that s/he will win the elections 
in the respective district. Taking into consideration the prevalence of ethnic 
cleavage for the electoral behavior in multiethnic areas in Romania, we can 
distinguish, in a similar vein, between ethnically competitive districts (the ones 
with ethnic diversity) and ethnically non-competitive districts (with low or 
inexistent ethnic diversity). Moreover, taking into consideration the fact that if no 
candidate has won a majority in the electoral district, there was a proportional 
redistribution of seats among parties at county level, we can also extend our 
classification to counties.  Consequently, we distinguish between ethnically 
competitive counties (with high ethnic diversity) and ethnically non-competitive 
counties (low ethnic diversity). 
Certainly in the Electoral Code Commission negotiations each party tried 
to maximize its chances of winning more parliamentary seats, by "drawing" the 
single-member electoral districts so that they overlap as closely as possible to the 
territorial distribution of its electorate. Therefore, each party sought to increase 
                                                          
12
 The party's electoral fiefdom is understood here as a place, area or region where a 
party/candidate regularly wins elections. 
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the number of 'safe' electoral districts (non-competitive) in which it will easily get 
a majority of votes and win the parliamentary seat. This risk-minimizing strategy 
has also implications for the resources allocated by political parties for electoral 
mobilization reasons. Thus, it is expected that political parties would focus their 
campaign resources in electoral districts that are really disputed and in which the 
mobilization of their own supporters, and also the undecided electors, can make 
a difference for one or the other of the parties/candidates. By contrast, in non-
competitive electoral districts it is expected that neither the dominant party, nor 
the other competing parties should consume too many resources to mobilize 
voters. On the one hand, eventually, dominant parties have and almost 
insurmountable electoral advantage and they are very sure of winning the 
election in that district. On the other hand, any other competing parties are not 
so much interested to invest/waste resources in mobilizing voters in an electoral 
district where the chances of winning are extremely small. Following this logic, 
the strategic mobilization of voters will be differentiated according to the type of 
electoral district: greater mobilization (and consequently higher electoral 
turnout) in competitive electoral districts: smaller mobilization (and hence a 
lower participation rates) in non-competitive districts. 
 
Patterns of electoral turnout in ethnically competitive vs. non-competitive counties 
 
In order to test the statistical significance of turnout variation between 
ethnically competitive and non-competitive counties, I have selected 16 counties 
from Transylvania that concentrate almost 99% of the Hungarians living in 
Romania (Kiss, Barna, & Sólyom, 2008). These counties are (abbreviations in 
parentheses):  Alba (AB), Arad (AR), Bihor (BH), Bistrita-Nasaud (BN), Brasov (BV), 
Caras-Severin (CS), Cluj (CJ), Covasna (CV), Harghita (HR), Hunedoara (HD), 
Maramures (MM), Mures (MR), Satu Mare (SM), Salaj (SJ), Sibiu (SB) and Timis 
(TM). In Table 2, I divided these counties into ethnically competitive (8 counties) 
and ethnically non-competitive (8 counties) based on the share of the Hungarians 
in the total population of the county.  An ethnically competitive county is one in 
which the Hungarians’ share is large enough to win at least one parliamentary 
seat (i.e. above 8% of the county’s population in the case of our data), but not so 
large that they would win almost all the seats in that county (i.e. below 50% of 
the total population of the county). Conversely, ethnically non-competitive 
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counties are the ones in which the Hungarian minority is too small (i.e. has no 
realistic chance to win even a single seat in the parliament) or too large (above 
50% and has all the chances to win almost all the seats in that county). In the 
absence of more valid data aggregated at county level, in Table 4, I use the share 
of Hungarians who voted for DAHR in each country as a proxy for the Hungarians’ 
turnout in that county. I base this assumption on two facts, already mentioned in 
the previous sections of this paper: a. the Hungarians who voted in the 2008 
parliamentary elections, actually voted in an overwhelming proportion for the 
DAHR’s candidates; b. the number of non-Hungarians who voted for DAHR is 
insignificant. 
 
Table 4: DAHR’s electoral performance in 2008: county aggregated data 
N
o. 
County 
Abbre
viation 
Hungarians who 
voted DAHR (%) 
(≈ turnout of 
Hungarians) 
Hungarian 
population in 
the county (%) 
Share of 
DAHR votes 
in the 
county (%) 
No. of 
parliamenta
ry seats won 
Ethnical
ly 
competi
tive 
county 
1 BN 38.5 5.9 5.4 0 No 
2 HR 37.6 84.6 74.3 4 No 
3 AB 31.6 5.4 4.1 0 No 
4 HD 31.2 5.2 3.5 0 No 
5 CV 27.5 73.8 61.5 3 No 
6 TM 24.9 7.5 5.3 0 No 
7 SB 23.5 3.6 2.1 0 No 
8 CS 22.8 1.7 1 0 No 
9 SJ 54.7 23 27 1 Yes 
10 MS 44.1 39.3 39.5 3 Yes 
11 BH 43.6 26 25.1 3 Yes 
12 SM 41.1 35.2 36.1 2 Yes 
13 CJ 36.6 17.4 16.4 2 Yes 
14 BV 34.1 8.7 7.6 1 Yes 
15 MM 31.4 9.1 7.8 1 Yes 
16 AR 30.6 10.7 8.3 1 Yes 
Source: own elaboration based on data published by Salat (2009, p. 123) and the Central Electoral 
Office (www.becparlamentare2008.ro). Note: An ethnically competitive county is one in which the 
Hungarian minority is large enough to win at least one parliamentary seat and the Hungarians 
represent less than 50% of the county’s population. 
 
Table 4 points out that in ethnically non-competitive counties the “under-
representation” of the Hungarian minority by DAHR tends to be higher than in 
ethnically competitive counties. That is the share of DAHR’s votes in 
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noncompetitive counties tends to be lower than the proportion of Hungarian 
population in those counties, compared with ethnically competitive counties. 
Moreover, in three ethnically competitive counties (SJ, MS, SM) actually DAHR 
managed to slightly “over-represent” the Hungarian minority by having a greater 
share of votes, than the actual proportion of Hungarians in the total population of 
those counties. This might suggest that, in these counties, DAHR succeeded to 
mobilize Hungarians better to turn out and vote, than did the other competing 
parties with their supporters. 
Besides the differences between ethnically competitive and non-
competitive counties, in general, there is a very high association between the 
proportion of Hungarian population and the share of votes DAHR obtained in each 
country (see Figure 2). These findings confirm the fact that demography (or head-
counting) is of special interest for ethnic parties (Salat, 2009) since their electoral 
success is a straightforward reflection of ethnic demography (Horowitz, 1985, 
apud. Alonso, 2008, p. 83). 
 
Figure 2: Demography and ethnic voting – county aggregated data 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data presented in Table 4 
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While the DAHR share of votes in a specific country almost linearly 
increases with the proportion of Hungarians living in that county, the 
relationship between the share of Hungarians in a county and the turnout of 
Hungarians in that county reveals a more complex pattern (see Figure 3). The 
relationship depicted in Figure 3 resembles more to a curvilinear pattern 
(reversed “U”) in which the turnout of Hungarians increases to a certain point 
after which decreases. More specifically, turnout tends to be lower in ethnically 
non-competitive counties, namely those with a low proportion of Hungarians 
and those in which Hungarians represent the majority of population (i.e. 
Harghita and Covasna).  
On the other hand, turnout tends to be higher in ethnically competitive 
counties where Hungarians’ proportion ranges somewhere between 8% and 
40% of the total population of the county. There is almost a 10-percentage 
points difference between the turnout of Hungarians residing in ethnically 
competitive and ethnically non-competitive counties. As such, the median 
turnout of Hungarians in ethnically competitive counties is 38.85% while the 
median turnout of Hungarians in ethnically non-competitive counties is of only 
29.35%. Hence, turnout of Hungarians is significantly higher in ethnically 
competitive counties, compared to ethnically non-competitive counties (Mann-
Whitney U = 11, z = -2,205, p=0.028, N=16).  
Moreover, residence in one type of county or another (i.e. ethnically 
competitive vs. non-competitive) had a strong effect on Hungarians’ turnout in 
the 2008 parliamentary elections (r = 0.55). These findings support the strategic 
mobilization of Hungarians according to different stakes assigned to the 
electoral process both by DAHR leaders and the Hungarian electorate. Thus we 
can notice a higher mobilization of voters by DAHR’s local branches and leaders 
in counties where political competition with the other parties was fierce and 
“every vote counted” for winning (more) seats to the Parliament. On the other 
hand, in counties where DAHR had no chance to win votes or in those where it 
had no strong challengers (i.e. Covasna and Harghita) the mobilization of voters 
was lower. The institutional context (i.e. the new electoral setup) and the 
territorial distribution of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania contributed to 
this electoral outcome. 
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Figure 3: Patterns of electoral turnout – county aggregated data  
 
Source: own elaboration based on data presented in Table 4 
 
In the parliamentary elections of 2008, DAHR took the strategic advantage 
of a relatively high geographic concentration of its electorate in non-competitive 
electoral districts (i.e. located in areas inhabited dominantly by Hungarians). It is 
not by chance that, for example, in Covasna County has been recorded one of the 
lowest turnout rate in the parliamentary elections of 2008, only 33.1%. Thus, the 
county ranked 40 out of 42 counties in Romania, in terms of turnout (a lower 
electoral participation rate was recorded only in Bucharest and Timis county). 
However, with about 35 000 votes in Covasna county (representing approximately 
61% of the total votes casted by the residents of this county), DAHR won 3 
parliamentary seats for the Chamber of Deputies (the fourth being assigned to PSD) 
and 2 seats of senators. Ironically, with a double number of votes (over 71 000, 
representing nearly 70% of the valid votes casted in the county constituency), 
DAHR obtained, in the previous elections of November 2004, the same number of 
deputies and senators in Covasna county. In other words, the DAHR achieved in 
2008 the same electoral outcomes in terms of number of MPs, "paying" only half 
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the cost of mobilizing their voters, compared to 2004. Or, put differently, the 
efficiency of resources used for electoral mobilization by the DAHR simply has 
doubled itself from 2004 to 2008. Not surprisingly, therefore the counties 
dominated numerically by Hungarians, namely Harghita and Covasna, are leading in 
a ranking of the counties with the strongest decrease in turnout rates from 1992 to 
2008 (Alexandru, et al., 2009): in Covasna electoral participation decreased with 
over 52 percentage points, and in Harghita turnout was lower with 48 percentage 
points in 2008, compared to 1992. On average, turnout in Romania declined by 37 
percentage points, over the same period. 
The significant differences between counties in terms of electoral turnout 
of DAHR’s partisans, suggests that the most plausible explanation for the higher 
rate of absenteeism of Hungarians from voting is the strategic (de)mobilization 
thesis. According to this thesis, there was a higher electoral mobilization of 
Hungarians in areas were the elections were ethnically competitive and where 
more votes really mattered for increasing the number of seats won by DAHR. On 
the other hand, in ethnically non-competitive districts DAHR’s leaders knew that 
they have no real chance to will even a single parliamentary seat, or on the 
contrary, in the areas where Hungarians represent the absolute majority DAHR 
leaders knew that they can easily win most (if not all) the parliamentary seats. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the 2008 parliamentary elections in Romania revealed not 
only a lower propensity of Hungarians to vote in general, but also, a lower turnout 
of DAHR’s partisans compared with the supporters of other major political parties 
in Romania. However, DAHR supporters’ absenteeism in the 2008 elections, higher 
than the national average, should not be interpreted primarily as a decrease in 
DAHR’s electoral adherence in areas inhabited mostly by Hungarians, but rather as 
a rational decision for a more efficient distribution of resources used for the 
strategic mobilization of the Hungarian electorate in uninominal districts where 
DAHR knew it will win the election anyway, even in the context of a modest 
electoral participation of its supporters. 
Although, in Romania, Hungarians as well as Romanians are increasingly 
dissatisfied with the performance of political elites, in general the lower turnout of 
the Hungarians in the 2008 parliamentary elections is not primarily due to the 
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dissatisfaction of voters with DAHR and its leaders. The paper showed that the 
relatively high abstention from vote of Hungarians is mainly a consequence of 
strategic de(mobilization) as a rational cost/benefit strategy adopted both by 
DAHR’s leaders and partisans. In this paper I discerned different mobilization 
strategies in various countries depending on the perceived stakes of the electoral 
process. On the one hand, one can notice high electoral mobilization in ethnically 
competitive counties where ‘every vote counts’ for wining more seats. In these 
counties there was an important stake for DAHR’s leaders and partisans in ‘getting 
out the vote’. On the other hand, there was a low electoral mobilization in 
ethnically non-competitive counties, where DAHR’s candidates had no realistic 
chance of winning even a single parliamentary seat or, on the contrary, had all the 
chances to win most of the seats. In these counties, there was no pragmatic reason 
to pay the cost of electoral mobilization. 
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